Role of PD in political unrest situations

As some of my previous posts have noted, effective public diplomacy relies on well thought out goals and objectives, as well as considerable time. Well thought out objectives, and time are not two characteristics of situations like the Arab Spring or many other situations where there is existing conflict or political unrest. Public diplomacy certainly can play a role in enduring conflicts or situations of political unrest, but dynamic, rapid situations do not yield themselves to being influenced by public diplomacy campaigns.

Operating under base assumptions that we are considering an unrest situation from the US perspective, public diplomacy can play only limited secondary roles. The US diplomatic bureaucracy typically moves too slowly to react to these situations and often does not have clear objectives or desired outcomes. If higher order diplomacy is unable to develop desired outcomes, how can a public diplomacy program be developed to achieve unclear objectives? For instance in Syria, the US still barely has objectives or goals and also has no good options. How should a public diplomacy program be established to create influence in this situation?

Overall the only way to create a situation where public diplomacy campaigns are effective in dynamic situations is to develop more a planning capacity in the diplomatic community to prepare for these situations. That cultural change though is wishful thinking and is extremely unlikely. Planning though would at least prepare diplomatic decision makers with options and perhaps even before there is nothing left but bad options. In this sense, planning could also identify opportunities where public diplomacy can be used in advance of a crisis situation either creating a potential means to prevent the crisis, or at worst, have more situational awareness 

Week 6: A Limited Role for New Media in PD

 

Events like Arab Spring shape not only the country where they are occurring but the international community watching in anticipation as the events unfold. In our readings this week there were opposing views offered on the effects of new media during times of political unrest. As we started discussing last week the challenges of technology in PD, this week’s readings truly continue the discussion just to a further level of specificity - the role of new media in PD in situations of conflict and political unrest.

Before being able to address the role of new media, I think it is fair to examine a critical challenge posed in one of this week’s reading. When considering if new media could be used in PD, I think it is fair to consider how new media is being used right now. In the USIP Blogs and Bullets II article the authors provide insight as to how new media was used in Arab Spring. “”We find stronger evidence that new media informs international audiences and mainstream media reporting rather than plays a direct role in organizing protests or allowing local audiences to share self-generated news directly with one another” (USIP, 5). If this case study suggests similar patterns for new media usage during times of conflict and political unrest, the challenge to PD will be to find how to appropriately use new media within the targeted country.

I don’t want to suggest that PD should not employ new media source during political unrest or conflict, but it should be done judicially to ensure results. A general understanding in conflict prevention programming is that militant and insurgent based groups (i.e. Al Shabaab)  use new media sources to influence and target audiences on an ongoing basis, not just at times of heighten conflict or political unrest. If that is the case, the use of new media for PD should be ongoing. If we look back again to our to our discussion last week, if PD begins or increases new media campaigns during political unrest or conflict there are risks of not accurately reflecting a message, not targeting the correct audience, or reporting without all the information.

 After considering events such as Arab Spring, USIP offers five levels that new media may affect political conflict. To mitigate risks, PD should consider focusing on simply the individual attitudes and behavior level. By focusing on this level, PD will provide opportunities to think and behave differently, and share ideas across borders. While the other levels offer interesting attributes, there are contentious aspects that run the risk of losing an audience or failing to meet a policy objective.

As conflict and political unrest continue PD will need to stay aware and monitor new media, however at this time, I think limited engagement during active unrest will reduce PD’s chance for miscommunication.

W6: What PD/Social Media Can Do

I’d like to comment on Livingston’s blog post from Group 3 this week.  (http://aupublicdiplomacy.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/is-public-diplomacy-fit-for-the-arab-spring-livingston-blog6/) S/he discusses the “problem with identifying the ‘role’ of public diplomacy in the Arab Spring” because of the “long disconnect between what a nation chooses to broadcast to foreign audiences and what it prefers to keep silent.”  S/he focuses more, however, on the internal government’s public diplomacy efforts as they face uprisings and riots from their people about their policies.  I definitely agree that that is one important aspect of public diplomacy, but I think the fact that the public is taking matters into their own hands and organizing themselves around various causes (often also through social media outlets) is the public’s diplomacy.  Were they to agree to dialogues with the government, which would be even better diplomacy, in its conventional understanding of discussion and dialogue.  Additionally, one can think about how other foreign governments are tracking the words and the actions of the nation-in-turmoil’s public, and how those states’ public diplomacy efforts are connecting with the people uprising.

Unfortunately, governments are still trying to repress their publics’ outspokenness.  This mainly comes from a desire to stay in power and not give up their government to the demands of their people.  Jillian York’s article discusses the challenges of “freedom of speech” with the arrest of bloggers in various regions of the world, the tracking and censoring of bloggers and other social media users, and the concern of “state-sponsored online propaganda” (40).  Professor Hayden mentioned these challenges as well in the lecture this week, specifically Internet penetration, press freedom, economic “comfort”, and demographic/sectarian divides.  These concerns hinder the progress that the public’s social media presence and on-the-ground activism.

Still, despite the notion that these conflicts had been brewing for years, waiting for an opportunity to explode and get the word out for a regime change, I think social media efforts of public diplomacy absolutely have the power to change a situation.  York says it “has created an unprecedented environment in which like-minded individuals and disparate networks are able to connect across geographical boundaries, which will no doubt allow new movements to flourish” (40).  I wholeheartedly agree with that statement, and think that social media can therefore be used for public diplomacy efforts very successfully, due simply to the wide range of people it has access to.  The New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring report mentioned the fact that older forms of media often picked up stories from the social media networks and globalized that same story even further.  Once the international community starts becoming aware of internal situations and getting involved in those affairs,  it puts greater pressure on that government to react and adapt their policies to better serve their public.  

Response: Digital Era challenging PD Principles

This week when thinking about my blog entry I kept thinking about how the digital age has shaped, and perhaps defined, our generation. Between Facebook, Twitter, Smart phones, and now smart TVs, any and all types of information is at your fingertips. While this could be advantageous, and it often seen as such, there are real challenges. Kim’s entry this week did an outstanding job tying together our readings, as well as others, pointing out the key challenges. 

In addition to some of the challenges, pointed out by Kim, I feel the biggest challenge to PD within this digital era is the speed of information flow compared to the overall objective of PD. I see this almost as a “race” – as of now either information win or PD principles win. As we have been learning throughout this course, PD is not just about getting the message out, but about getting the right message out. If we look back to one of our first weeks, Matthew Wallin describes the principles of PD as understanding the policy objective, understanding the target audience, identify the target audience, listen, establish a narrative, be truthful, follow through on policy commitments use force multipliers, don’t reinvent the wheel, and then select the appropriate medium (21). If PD is based on the success of each of these tenets, then it could be assumed that as a field, PD is strategic in nature. Through the use of digital or social media, targeted or tailor approaches are less possible. Basically, PD may have to choose, get information out or hold true to the principles of the field.   Perhaps through a better understanding of their target audience, examining online users and the investments in knowledge management, PD and the digital era can find equilibrium.

W5: Real-Time Diplomacy Challenges (And Benefits)

Ironically, as I was getting ready to write my response to the second question this week, I came across the following article in the Huffington Post Blog that very clearly summarizes all of the issues and challenges with the rise of digital diplomacy and social media discussed in the readings this week: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreas-sandre/fast-diplomacy_b_3416330.html.  Mr. Sandre, a Press and Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy of Italy in Washington, states that social media and digital diplomacy are causing a transformation very fast and affecting “the very DNA of how governments interact with each other and their publics.”  He quotes Secretary of State John Kerry, who wrote recently that “everybody sees change now. With social media, when you say something to one person, a thousand people hear it.”  This, I think many would argue, is one of the benefits of the rise of digital diplomacy – the opportunity to have a message reach many more people in much less time (which, for example, would change historic incidents like the long journey of Paul Revere to let his fellow Americans know that ‘the British are coming’ and allow that message to be sent in a much easier, quicker way).  But Mr. Sandre and others have noted that at the same time, “because social media exponentially multiplies a message and its reach, mistakes often occur in sudden and unexpected fashion.”

To focus more on the challenges than the opportunities and benefits at this point, it is important to point out that making quick decisions in foreign policy is absolutely not ideal.  Perhaps governments should be getting involved in issues that “go viral” on the Internet, so to speak, but this also complicates policies by having the media force world leaders to address a particular death or particular release of information.  When that happens, other work and diplomacy goals get set aside in order to deal with the more pressing issue at hand, according to a certain portion of the public on a particular digital forum.  And yet, as I write this, and think back to an Economist quote that Seib discussed, “the Internet is making news more participatory, social, diverse and partisan, reviving the discursive ethos of the era before mass media” (46).  At least in any democracy, shouldn’t you want more citizens involved in the goings-on in the world, offering up opinions so that elected representatives can more effectively govern on behalf of those people?

One major issue though, is the nature of social media as an individual, personal, and fast sort of communication.  This does not necessarily work well with the bureaucracy of governments, who need to have all communications vetted.  Hanson’s article pointed to this as well, citing an example from the US Embassy in Cairo, who posted a statement on Twitter in an “effort to defuse escalating tensions,” but had an administration official disown the initial statement shortly thereafter, explaining that it was “not cleared by Washington and does not reflect the views of the United States government” (13).  If every Embassy representative has to get their live communications cleared by Washington, at a time of crisis in-country that their public diplomacy efforts (through social media outlets) are aiming to control, this creates an extraordinary challenge for public diplomacy in the digital sphere. 

One of my favorite sections comes from Seib’s example of George Kennan, who observed that diplomats-then were “men so measured and prudent in their judgment of others, so careful to reserve that judgment until they felt they had the facts, [and] so well aware of the danger of inadequate evidence and hasty conclusion…”(71).  Nowadays, taking one’s time with the vast majority of issues is no longer as possible with the “pressures to move quickly, acknowledging, if not matching, the pace set by communication technologies that deliver information” (86).  Many of the authors this week discussed the State Department’s (and other organizations’) specific departments with employees intended to scour the Internet and other communication outlets in an effort to be better aware of and manage the saturated information environment.  I agree, however, with Seib in that diplomats and government officials in general “must [sometimes] push back against media-driven public expectations that all problems can be resolved at the same high speed with which information is provided” (86).  One thing is certain.  As diplomats continue to do their work and strategize, the role of the public has been allowed to expand through real-time media outlets, and diplomats therefore must bring the public into their work, making "public diplomacy" more important than ever.

W4: A Response to PD Measurement

I completely understand the need to evaluate public diplomacy programs due to their need to “receive financial support from government agencies, foundations, corporations, and/or individual donors,” and the need to show their worth to such organizations to solidify that financial support (Olberding).  It is definitely a very complicated issue, however, considering most have long-term goals of changing the “hearts and minds,” so to speak, of the local people in whatever country (some more than others). 

I really appreciated Julia’s post this week, discussing more concretely the ideas presented by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and British Council.  As she notes, these organizations, in their evaluations, have grounded their studies by considering the long term and ongoing evaluation challenges.  As Banfield’s statement indicates, however, these long term effects and changing impact are “very difficult to measure year to year.”  Professor Hayden’s lecture this week also capitalizes on this point, and mentions Tara Sonenshine’s statement as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in a speech about public diplomacy, and its challenges in evaluating the long-term impacts.  He suggests that this statement is factual, but not enough of a solution, with which I agree, but unfortunately have not yet been able to find my own solution to the problem. 

The International Visitor Program at the State Department has done a somewhat effective job at showing its impact.  Statistics from evaluators in Philadelphia found that “97.1% of hosts/resources agreed that hosting and/or interacting with foreign visitors participating in exchange programs promotes mutual understanding among Americans and foreigners; 94.2% reported having ‘basic to advanced knowledge’ about the culture and country of the foreign visitors immediately after the hosting experience, compared to 75.3% before the experience…,” among others.  These statistics clearly show an impact on the people involved, and Olberding and Olberding further note that “youth peacebuilding or exchange programs can impact not only the exchange students who travel and stay in other countries (that is, the direct participants), but also the other individuals who are involved with the program is less direct ways, including chaperones who may travel with the exchange students, host families, and students and teachers in the host school (that is, indirect participants).”  Is this enough?  That is, does knowing that a wide number of people involved in such exchanges -- one example of a public diplomacy program -- are affected in a largely positive way help evaluate the success overall of such programs?  Having a more favorable opinion of other countries based on these interactions does not necessarily lead to other action on the part of that individual, so although I personally find these programs and interactions extremely valuable in the long term in giving people around the world a more humane and deeper understanding of their neighbors, I wonder if that statement is enough to convince a foundation to keep paying for them. 

Going back to Julia’s post, I very much hope that her evidence-based, innovating evaluative model will work and change the future of public diplomacy.  I would agree with her that the “influence tracker” sounds the most interesting, and would like to continue to learn about their efforts in supporting such evaluation measures.

Week 4: FCO/British Council - A Valuable PD Measurement Model

I found this week’s article from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and British Council particularly interesting, and perhaps the most in line with what I would recommend for measurement and evaluation techniques as it relates to PD. As monitoring and evaluating any field is important, to better understand policy/programming progression, and determine impact and change, it is equally important to ensure that the evaluation model is appropriate to the task at hand. I want to highlight a few reasons I think the FCO/British Council pilot framework may be on track to provide the most valuable insight for measuring PD.

The Framework is grounded. By saying the FCO/British Council framework is grounded I am suggesting that the framework has considered both long term and ongoing evaluation challenges.

·         Long Term. FCO/British Council stated they took into consideration the persistent nature of PD when building their model. Tim Banfield’s stated “Public diplomacy is about building relationships between diverse nations and cultures, and these are constantly influenced by many external factors. And because the full effect of the council activities may only because evident after long periods, its changing impact is very difficult to measure year to year.”

·         Evidence Based Model. To ensure their framework was responsive throughout the period of measurement, FCO/British Council created an evidence based model. As an evidence based model, FCO/British Council will be looking for the standard set of long-term outcomes, intermediate outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs – all of which feed an ultimate goal. With an evidence based model, depending on outputs, outcomes can shift over the course of measuring.  FCO/British Council discuss this as intangibility.

Innovation. The FCO/British Council model appears to have successfully integrated three innovative evaluation tools to measure impact. These tools will measure more short-term, however over extended periods of time could inform PD policy. I particularly interested in the influence tracker and believe that this tracker, while potentially the most challenging to measure, could have the most significant impact on PD programming.

In the end, what makes this framework so valuable is that it is evidence based, with additional innovative trackers to distinguish this model from other traditional development models. It will be interesting to see if the pilots areas expand and if the impact is what is expected.

Should we distinguish cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy? Why?

In many of the readings, the terms cultural diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy were used near interchangeably. However, some of the readings provided the nuanced differences between the terms. The similarities though between the terms are clearly evident and show how the terms are interrelated and components of one another.

When describing cultural diplomacy, Memis notes “The importance of defining target audiences, objectives, outcomes and success measures is central to our evaluation system; planning, monitoring and evaluation are therefore are inextricably linked.” Moreover, cultural diplomacy relies on, “Establishing clear, concise and ambitious organizational objectives not only provides a compass for every action we take, but it provides a set of targets which enable effective evaluation.” This is very similar to the necessity of having a coherent, well-defined strategy when conducting strategic level public diplomacy. The difference between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy at this objective level appears to be the scale that the two terms or efforts are assessed.  While public diplomacy is clearly at the strategic national level, cultural diplomacy appears to be at a more targeted lower level, and likely easier to assess than public diplomacy objectives.

Beyond the similarities at the defining level, cultural diplomacy is clearly a component of public diplomacy and the concepts should be distinguished, but not necessarily decoupled. Much like public diplomacy is a component of diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is a tool that can be used for public diplomacy purposes to engage foreign audiences, however with the benefit of often being a degree separated from official government actions. What appears to be the most critical factor of cultural diplomacy, and is at the surface very different from public diplomacy is the emphasis of listening and responding rather than dictating and clearly messaging as is often the perceived and actual approach with public diplomacy. Leveraging cultural diplomacy as a part of a wider public diplomacy program is a wise approach and although it should be differentiated, it should not be overlooked as a useful component. 

Week 3: Dialogue and Collaboration: the most effective kind of Cultural Diplomacy

This week's reading made me reflect a lot about both my current work within international development and my mothers work in the performing arts. Having grown up surrounded by the performing arts, theater, dance and music and now being solely focused on building international relationships cultural diplomacy, as a whole, resonated with me as the bridge between these two (as well as many more) fields. While Cull's piece breaks cultural diplomacy into four categories, I appreciated that he emphasized that successful programs integrate all four aspects- the prestige gift, cultural information, dialogue and collaboration, and capacity building. That being said, perhaps it is because of my background, I think Cull’s “dialogue and collaboration” type of cultural diplomacy is vital for any larger public diplomacy policy.

Mr. Harvey from the Cultures in Harmony best practices article said it best "Build a relationship. You are feeding an entire nation." If the purpose of cultural diplomacy is to best represent a nation abroad and "dismantle potential cultural barriers", then the use of dialogue and collaboration is the first and most critical step in any cultural or public diplomacy policy. Positive results from dialogue and collaboration can ensure sustainable relationships are forged and a deeper understanding of one’s culture is appreciated.  This understanding can lead to a foundation for within other aspects of foreign relations. In one of my favorite examples of successful dialogue and collaboration, the Brooklyn Academy of music (BAM) held a 2-day conference bringing together "44 performers, writers, cultural entrepreneurs, government officials, commentators, religious leaders, and scholars from around the globe to promote understand...According to a local Brooklyn business owner who participated in the festival, 'it's good for the country. This is a way to just talk together'". This perfect example show how a simple dialogue and collaborative event can lead to future events, but also help build foundations in critical sectors for public diplomacy.

 

Similarly, I was struck by the work that American Voices and Youth Excellence on Stage Academies (YES) have been doing to shift the perspectives of motivated and artistic youth who may have held negative views toward the United States.  YES has been working to provide these alternate perspectives through cultural genres, such as Broadway, Jazz, Hip Hop, theater. These types of dialogue and collaboration are more indirect, but still have been shaping lives in challenging countries where public diplomacy campaigns could build upon.

Finally, I would like to discuss dialogue and collaboration in a personal context. Annually my mother’s o organization hosts a domestic theater-based conference, bringing together numerous organizations, theaters, actresses/actors, investors from throughout the country to share new ideas, build relationship and many find jobs. I think the conference totals about 4000. When I was working on a challenging proposal for Nigeria about 9 months ago, I went to my Mother to discuss with her theater organizations working abroad. I did this for many of the reasons Cull and the Task Force best practices discuss, the arts know how to engage, stimulate and build relationships that bridge culture. If any type of the cultural diplomacy should be isolated, I truly feel that it is dialogue and collaboration.