Role of PD in political unrest situations

As some of my previous posts have noted, effective public diplomacy relies on well thought out goals and objectives, as well as considerable time. Well thought out objectives, and time are not two characteristics of situations like the Arab Spring or many other situations where there is existing conflict or political unrest. Public diplomacy certainly can play a role in enduring conflicts or situations of political unrest, but dynamic, rapid situations do not yield themselves to being influenced by public diplomacy campaigns.

Operating under base assumptions that we are considering an unrest situation from the US perspective, public diplomacy can play only limited secondary roles. The US diplomatic bureaucracy typically moves too slowly to react to these situations and often does not have clear objectives or desired outcomes. If higher order diplomacy is unable to develop desired outcomes, how can a public diplomacy program be developed to achieve unclear objectives? For instance in Syria, the US still barely has objectives or goals and also has no good options. How should a public diplomacy program be established to create influence in this situation?

Overall the only way to create a situation where public diplomacy campaigns are effective in dynamic situations is to develop more a planning capacity in the diplomatic community to prepare for these situations. That cultural change though is wishful thinking and is extremely unlikely. Planning though would at least prepare diplomatic decision makers with options and perhaps even before there is nothing left but bad options. In this sense, planning could also identify opportunities where public diplomacy can be used in advance of a crisis situation either creating a potential means to prevent the crisis, or at worst, have more situational awareness 

Week 6: A Limited Role for New Media in PD

 

Events like Arab Spring shape not only the country where they are occurring but the international community watching in anticipation as the events unfold. In our readings this week there were opposing views offered on the effects of new media during times of political unrest. As we started discussing last week the challenges of technology in PD, this week’s readings truly continue the discussion just to a further level of specificity - the role of new media in PD in situations of conflict and political unrest.

Before being able to address the role of new media, I think it is fair to examine a critical challenge posed in one of this week’s reading. When considering if new media could be used in PD, I think it is fair to consider how new media is being used right now. In the USIP Blogs and Bullets II article the authors provide insight as to how new media was used in Arab Spring. “”We find stronger evidence that new media informs international audiences and mainstream media reporting rather than plays a direct role in organizing protests or allowing local audiences to share self-generated news directly with one another” (USIP, 5). If this case study suggests similar patterns for new media usage during times of conflict and political unrest, the challenge to PD will be to find how to appropriately use new media within the targeted country.

I don’t want to suggest that PD should not employ new media source during political unrest or conflict, but it should be done judicially to ensure results. A general understanding in conflict prevention programming is that militant and insurgent based groups (i.e. Al Shabaab)  use new media sources to influence and target audiences on an ongoing basis, not just at times of heighten conflict or political unrest. If that is the case, the use of new media for PD should be ongoing. If we look back again to our to our discussion last week, if PD begins or increases new media campaigns during political unrest or conflict there are risks of not accurately reflecting a message, not targeting the correct audience, or reporting without all the information.

 After considering events such as Arab Spring, USIP offers five levels that new media may affect political conflict. To mitigate risks, PD should consider focusing on simply the individual attitudes and behavior level. By focusing on this level, PD will provide opportunities to think and behave differently, and share ideas across borders. While the other levels offer interesting attributes, there are contentious aspects that run the risk of losing an audience or failing to meet a policy objective.

As conflict and political unrest continue PD will need to stay aware and monitor new media, however at this time, I think limited engagement during active unrest will reduce PD’s chance for miscommunication.

W6: What PD/Social Media Can Do

I’d like to comment on Livingston’s blog post from Group 3 this week.  (http://aupublicdiplomacy.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/is-public-diplomacy-fit-for-the-arab-spring-livingston-blog6/) S/he discusses the “problem with identifying the ‘role’ of public diplomacy in the Arab Spring” because of the “long disconnect between what a nation chooses to broadcast to foreign audiences and what it prefers to keep silent.”  S/he focuses more, however, on the internal government’s public diplomacy efforts as they face uprisings and riots from their people about their policies.  I definitely agree that that is one important aspect of public diplomacy, but I think the fact that the public is taking matters into their own hands and organizing themselves around various causes (often also through social media outlets) is the public’s diplomacy.  Were they to agree to dialogues with the government, which would be even better diplomacy, in its conventional understanding of discussion and dialogue.  Additionally, one can think about how other foreign governments are tracking the words and the actions of the nation-in-turmoil’s public, and how those states’ public diplomacy efforts are connecting with the people uprising.

Unfortunately, governments are still trying to repress their publics’ outspokenness.  This mainly comes from a desire to stay in power and not give up their government to the demands of their people.  Jillian York’s article discusses the challenges of “freedom of speech” with the arrest of bloggers in various regions of the world, the tracking and censoring of bloggers and other social media users, and the concern of “state-sponsored online propaganda” (40).  Professor Hayden mentioned these challenges as well in the lecture this week, specifically Internet penetration, press freedom, economic “comfort”, and demographic/sectarian divides.  These concerns hinder the progress that the public’s social media presence and on-the-ground activism.

Still, despite the notion that these conflicts had been brewing for years, waiting for an opportunity to explode and get the word out for a regime change, I think social media efforts of public diplomacy absolutely have the power to change a situation.  York says it “has created an unprecedented environment in which like-minded individuals and disparate networks are able to connect across geographical boundaries, which will no doubt allow new movements to flourish” (40).  I wholeheartedly agree with that statement, and think that social media can therefore be used for public diplomacy efforts very successfully, due simply to the wide range of people it has access to.  The New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring report mentioned the fact that older forms of media often picked up stories from the social media networks and globalized that same story even further.  Once the international community starts becoming aware of internal situations and getting involved in those affairs,  it puts greater pressure on that government to react and adapt their policies to better serve their public.  

Response: Digital Era challenging PD Principles

This week when thinking about my blog entry I kept thinking about how the digital age has shaped, and perhaps defined, our generation. Between Facebook, Twitter, Smart phones, and now smart TVs, any and all types of information is at your fingertips. While this could be advantageous, and it often seen as such, there are real challenges. Kim’s entry this week did an outstanding job tying together our readings, as well as others, pointing out the key challenges. 

In addition to some of the challenges, pointed out by Kim, I feel the biggest challenge to PD within this digital era is the speed of information flow compared to the overall objective of PD. I see this almost as a “race” – as of now either information win or PD principles win. As we have been learning throughout this course, PD is not just about getting the message out, but about getting the right message out. If we look back to one of our first weeks, Matthew Wallin describes the principles of PD as understanding the policy objective, understanding the target audience, identify the target audience, listen, establish a narrative, be truthful, follow through on policy commitments use force multipliers, don’t reinvent the wheel, and then select the appropriate medium (21). If PD is based on the success of each of these tenets, then it could be assumed that as a field, PD is strategic in nature. Through the use of digital or social media, targeted or tailor approaches are less possible. Basically, PD may have to choose, get information out or hold true to the principles of the field.   Perhaps through a better understanding of their target audience, examining online users and the investments in knowledge management, PD and the digital era can find equilibrium.

W5: Real-Time Diplomacy Challenges (And Benefits)

Ironically, as I was getting ready to write my response to the second question this week, I came across the following article in the Huffington Post Blog that very clearly summarizes all of the issues and challenges with the rise of digital diplomacy and social media discussed in the readings this week: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreas-sandre/fast-diplomacy_b_3416330.html.  Mr. Sandre, a Press and Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy of Italy in Washington, states that social media and digital diplomacy are causing a transformation very fast and affecting “the very DNA of how governments interact with each other and their publics.”  He quotes Secretary of State John Kerry, who wrote recently that “everybody sees change now. With social media, when you say something to one person, a thousand people hear it.”  This, I think many would argue, is one of the benefits of the rise of digital diplomacy – the opportunity to have a message reach many more people in much less time (which, for example, would change historic incidents like the long journey of Paul Revere to let his fellow Americans know that ‘the British are coming’ and allow that message to be sent in a much easier, quicker way).  But Mr. Sandre and others have noted that at the same time, “because social media exponentially multiplies a message and its reach, mistakes often occur in sudden and unexpected fashion.”

To focus more on the challenges than the opportunities and benefits at this point, it is important to point out that making quick decisions in foreign policy is absolutely not ideal.  Perhaps governments should be getting involved in issues that “go viral” on the Internet, so to speak, but this also complicates policies by having the media force world leaders to address a particular death or particular release of information.  When that happens, other work and diplomacy goals get set aside in order to deal with the more pressing issue at hand, according to a certain portion of the public on a particular digital forum.  And yet, as I write this, and think back to an Economist quote that Seib discussed, “the Internet is making news more participatory, social, diverse and partisan, reviving the discursive ethos of the era before mass media” (46).  At least in any democracy, shouldn’t you want more citizens involved in the goings-on in the world, offering up opinions so that elected representatives can more effectively govern on behalf of those people?

One major issue though, is the nature of social media as an individual, personal, and fast sort of communication.  This does not necessarily work well with the bureaucracy of governments, who need to have all communications vetted.  Hanson’s article pointed to this as well, citing an example from the US Embassy in Cairo, who posted a statement on Twitter in an “effort to defuse escalating tensions,” but had an administration official disown the initial statement shortly thereafter, explaining that it was “not cleared by Washington and does not reflect the views of the United States government” (13).  If every Embassy representative has to get their live communications cleared by Washington, at a time of crisis in-country that their public diplomacy efforts (through social media outlets) are aiming to control, this creates an extraordinary challenge for public diplomacy in the digital sphere. 

One of my favorite sections comes from Seib’s example of George Kennan, who observed that diplomats-then were “men so measured and prudent in their judgment of others, so careful to reserve that judgment until they felt they had the facts, [and] so well aware of the danger of inadequate evidence and hasty conclusion…”(71).  Nowadays, taking one’s time with the vast majority of issues is no longer as possible with the “pressures to move quickly, acknowledging, if not matching, the pace set by communication technologies that deliver information” (86).  Many of the authors this week discussed the State Department’s (and other organizations’) specific departments with employees intended to scour the Internet and other communication outlets in an effort to be better aware of and manage the saturated information environment.  I agree, however, with Seib in that diplomats and government officials in general “must [sometimes] push back against media-driven public expectations that all problems can be resolved at the same high speed with which information is provided” (86).  One thing is certain.  As diplomats continue to do their work and strategize, the role of the public has been allowed to expand through real-time media outlets, and diplomats therefore must bring the public into their work, making "public diplomacy" more important than ever.

W4: A Response to PD Measurement

I completely understand the need to evaluate public diplomacy programs due to their need to “receive financial support from government agencies, foundations, corporations, and/or individual donors,” and the need to show their worth to such organizations to solidify that financial support (Olberding).  It is definitely a very complicated issue, however, considering most have long-term goals of changing the “hearts and minds,” so to speak, of the local people in whatever country (some more than others). 

I really appreciated Julia’s post this week, discussing more concretely the ideas presented by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and British Council.  As she notes, these organizations, in their evaluations, have grounded their studies by considering the long term and ongoing evaluation challenges.  As Banfield’s statement indicates, however, these long term effects and changing impact are “very difficult to measure year to year.”  Professor Hayden’s lecture this week also capitalizes on this point, and mentions Tara Sonenshine’s statement as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in a speech about public diplomacy, and its challenges in evaluating the long-term impacts.  He suggests that this statement is factual, but not enough of a solution, with which I agree, but unfortunately have not yet been able to find my own solution to the problem. 

The International Visitor Program at the State Department has done a somewhat effective job at showing its impact.  Statistics from evaluators in Philadelphia found that “97.1% of hosts/resources agreed that hosting and/or interacting with foreign visitors participating in exchange programs promotes mutual understanding among Americans and foreigners; 94.2% reported having ‘basic to advanced knowledge’ about the culture and country of the foreign visitors immediately after the hosting experience, compared to 75.3% before the experience…,” among others.  These statistics clearly show an impact on the people involved, and Olberding and Olberding further note that “youth peacebuilding or exchange programs can impact not only the exchange students who travel and stay in other countries (that is, the direct participants), but also the other individuals who are involved with the program is less direct ways, including chaperones who may travel with the exchange students, host families, and students and teachers in the host school (that is, indirect participants).”  Is this enough?  That is, does knowing that a wide number of people involved in such exchanges -- one example of a public diplomacy program -- are affected in a largely positive way help evaluate the success overall of such programs?  Having a more favorable opinion of other countries based on these interactions does not necessarily lead to other action on the part of that individual, so although I personally find these programs and interactions extremely valuable in the long term in giving people around the world a more humane and deeper understanding of their neighbors, I wonder if that statement is enough to convince a foundation to keep paying for them. 

Going back to Julia’s post, I very much hope that her evidence-based, innovating evaluative model will work and change the future of public diplomacy.  I would agree with her that the “influence tracker” sounds the most interesting, and would like to continue to learn about their efforts in supporting such evaluation measures.

Week 4: FCO/British Council - A Valuable PD Measurement Model

I found this week’s article from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and British Council particularly interesting, and perhaps the most in line with what I would recommend for measurement and evaluation techniques as it relates to PD. As monitoring and evaluating any field is important, to better understand policy/programming progression, and determine impact and change, it is equally important to ensure that the evaluation model is appropriate to the task at hand. I want to highlight a few reasons I think the FCO/British Council pilot framework may be on track to provide the most valuable insight for measuring PD.

The Framework is grounded. By saying the FCO/British Council framework is grounded I am suggesting that the framework has considered both long term and ongoing evaluation challenges.

·         Long Term. FCO/British Council stated they took into consideration the persistent nature of PD when building their model. Tim Banfield’s stated “Public diplomacy is about building relationships between diverse nations and cultures, and these are constantly influenced by many external factors. And because the full effect of the council activities may only because evident after long periods, its changing impact is very difficult to measure year to year.”

·         Evidence Based Model. To ensure their framework was responsive throughout the period of measurement, FCO/British Council created an evidence based model. As an evidence based model, FCO/British Council will be looking for the standard set of long-term outcomes, intermediate outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs – all of which feed an ultimate goal. With an evidence based model, depending on outputs, outcomes can shift over the course of measuring.  FCO/British Council discuss this as intangibility.

Innovation. The FCO/British Council model appears to have successfully integrated three innovative evaluation tools to measure impact. These tools will measure more short-term, however over extended periods of time could inform PD policy. I particularly interested in the influence tracker and believe that this tracker, while potentially the most challenging to measure, could have the most significant impact on PD programming.

In the end, what makes this framework so valuable is that it is evidence based, with additional innovative trackers to distinguish this model from other traditional development models. It will be interesting to see if the pilots areas expand and if the impact is what is expected.

Should we distinguish cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy? Why?

In many of the readings, the terms cultural diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy were used near interchangeably. However, some of the readings provided the nuanced differences between the terms. The similarities though between the terms are clearly evident and show how the terms are interrelated and components of one another.

When describing cultural diplomacy, Memis notes “The importance of defining target audiences, objectives, outcomes and success measures is central to our evaluation system; planning, monitoring and evaluation are therefore are inextricably linked.” Moreover, cultural diplomacy relies on, “Establishing clear, concise and ambitious organizational objectives not only provides a compass for every action we take, but it provides a set of targets which enable effective evaluation.” This is very similar to the necessity of having a coherent, well-defined strategy when conducting strategic level public diplomacy. The difference between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy at this objective level appears to be the scale that the two terms or efforts are assessed.  While public diplomacy is clearly at the strategic national level, cultural diplomacy appears to be at a more targeted lower level, and likely easier to assess than public diplomacy objectives.

Beyond the similarities at the defining level, cultural diplomacy is clearly a component of public diplomacy and the concepts should be distinguished, but not necessarily decoupled. Much like public diplomacy is a component of diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is a tool that can be used for public diplomacy purposes to engage foreign audiences, however with the benefit of often being a degree separated from official government actions. What appears to be the most critical factor of cultural diplomacy, and is at the surface very different from public diplomacy is the emphasis of listening and responding rather than dictating and clearly messaging as is often the perceived and actual approach with public diplomacy. Leveraging cultural diplomacy as a part of a wider public diplomacy program is a wise approach and although it should be differentiated, it should not be overlooked as a useful component. 

Week 3: Dialogue and Collaboration: the most effective kind of Cultural Diplomacy

This week's reading made me reflect a lot about both my current work within international development and my mothers work in the performing arts. Having grown up surrounded by the performing arts, theater, dance and music and now being solely focused on building international relationships cultural diplomacy, as a whole, resonated with me as the bridge between these two (as well as many more) fields. While Cull's piece breaks cultural diplomacy into four categories, I appreciated that he emphasized that successful programs integrate all four aspects- the prestige gift, cultural information, dialogue and collaboration, and capacity building. That being said, perhaps it is because of my background, I think Cull’s “dialogue and collaboration” type of cultural diplomacy is vital for any larger public diplomacy policy.

Mr. Harvey from the Cultures in Harmony best practices article said it best "Build a relationship. You are feeding an entire nation." If the purpose of cultural diplomacy is to best represent a nation abroad and "dismantle potential cultural barriers", then the use of dialogue and collaboration is the first and most critical step in any cultural or public diplomacy policy. Positive results from dialogue and collaboration can ensure sustainable relationships are forged and a deeper understanding of one’s culture is appreciated.  This understanding can lead to a foundation for within other aspects of foreign relations. In one of my favorite examples of successful dialogue and collaboration, the Brooklyn Academy of music (BAM) held a 2-day conference bringing together "44 performers, writers, cultural entrepreneurs, government officials, commentators, religious leaders, and scholars from around the globe to promote understand...According to a local Brooklyn business owner who participated in the festival, 'it's good for the country. This is a way to just talk together'". This perfect example show how a simple dialogue and collaborative event can lead to future events, but also help build foundations in critical sectors for public diplomacy.

 

Similarly, I was struck by the work that American Voices and Youth Excellence on Stage Academies (YES) have been doing to shift the perspectives of motivated and artistic youth who may have held negative views toward the United States.  YES has been working to provide these alternate perspectives through cultural genres, such as Broadway, Jazz, Hip Hop, theater. These types of dialogue and collaboration are more indirect, but still have been shaping lives in challenging countries where public diplomacy campaigns could build upon.

Finally, I would like to discuss dialogue and collaboration in a personal context. Annually my mother’s o organization hosts a domestic theater-based conference, bringing together numerous organizations, theaters, actresses/actors, investors from throughout the country to share new ideas, build relationship and many find jobs. I think the conference totals about 4000. When I was working on a challenging proposal for Nigeria about 9 months ago, I went to my Mother to discuss with her theater organizations working abroad. I did this for many of the reasons Cull and the Task Force best practices discuss, the arts know how to engage, stimulate and build relationships that bridge culture. If any type of the cultural diplomacy should be isolated, I truly feel that it is dialogue and collaboration.

 

 

 

 

W3: Cultural Diplomacy Should be Better Utilized

One of the most striking things about how cultural diplomacy was discussed this week was its connection to a country’s soft power.  I wonder how much of this influence is necessarily imposed, however, and outreach efforts are actively pursued; or rather, whether such influence is attributed to stereotypes given by various organizations or media outlets from within a country.  Those groups inherently promote certain aspects or patterns from their host culture and the world designates it as that culture.  For example, as Schneider’s article stated, the United States of America is the “country with the most influential culture in the world” “that least acknowledges and uses its persuasive powers.”  She pointed to the U.S. born “jazz music” and television shows “Dallas” and “Friends.”  My cousins in France always used to ask me about the accuracy of these types of stereotypes, mostly from various TV shows, or whether I ate hamburgers every day or even rode horses to school (I grew up in Texas).  I think that culture (and especially one’s perception of another’s culture) has an enormous amount of possible influence or change, and absolutely should be utilized in public diplomacy efforts.

One of the questions this week asked whether cultural diplomacy should be distinguished from other public diplomacy efforts.  I definitely think so.  As Nick Cull’s article states, “cultural diplomacy is a type of public diplomacy.”  Capitalizing on a particular country’s cultural traits can bring an entirely new dynamic to diplomacy, to events sponsored in-country, and can additionally help find similarities between cultures that may allow work to be done on another level.  I would argue, however, that shows like American Idol, although great for apparently promoting “equal opportunity, merit-based competition, and selection by voting” in and of itself is not cultural diplomacy (Schneider).  Unless of course, that TV show were to travel to another country through a non-profit or other organization or embassy, and bring U.S. artists to meet and interact with local counterparts, exchange opinions, and share their talents and culture with each other. 

One of my favorite articles this week was the compilation of best practice organizations by the U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy, which highlighted how each group worked on international cultural engagement.  They argue that this concept has never been more important, with “the reliance of identity politics (national, regional, ethnic, and religious) and sub-state actors on cultural symbols and creative expression; and the increased importance of cultural products and services in global commerce and trade,” among other things.  Through music, film, dance, writing – you name it – these groups travel around the world to bring these aspects of American culture to them, and most of the time learn from the local culture at the same time.   The dialogue and interaction opens minds, allows for enhanced creativity, and encourages cooperation on another, very personal level than the generic political or business meetings where these interactions normally occur.

To bring this a step further, I loved Dr. Sherry Mueller’s description of citizen diplomacy, which I would argue is absolutely an integral part of cultural diplomacy.  “One handshake at a time,” she says that individuals are empowered to shape and strengthen foreign relations.  The International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) works at this as well, by allowing visitors to additionally interact with U.S. citizens “‘beyond the headlines’ and help them develop a more realistic and nuanced understanding and appreciation for the history, heritage, democratic institutions, and fundamental values of the United States.”  Her claim that the “home hospitality” visits are the favorite and lasting memories from a visitor’s trip is incredibly important, and truly highlights the effectiveness of personal, cultural interactions.

Week 2: Further thought on What we can Learn

In Kim’s entry this week she highlighted the element of “listening”. As we highlighted last week, and she discussed this week through her discussion of the case studies, this is truly a critical aspect in ensuring PD is successful. Through “listening” those managing PD strategy are more likely to create a locally appropriate and tailored message.  As Kim pointed out, this led to a much more powerful and successfully PD campaign in Pakistan by using Urdu versus English. 

Similarly, I was fascinated by the Bahrain case study. Although the situation within the country situation was extremely tense, the term “sectarian” violence was being used, and international media was being restricted, the US Embassy was able to respond with a media campaign that eventually integrated social media. By effectively utilizing both English and Arabic, and responding to the multiple waves of violence, the US Embassy proved how a responsive PD can be as a foreign policy tool.

I also appreciated  Kim’s point about creative alternation projects. I believe she summarized a lot of the case studies with this concept. As a development practitioner, these case studies provided creative ideas without needing significant amount of money.  Some of the easiest to implement – YouTube series, Alumni Outreach, Facebook/Twitter.

PD in organizational and institutional contexts

Public diplomacy faces many of the same challenges that any program or initiative tied to the government faces in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.  However, organizations and bureaucracies though generally considered with a negative connotation are necessary to gather and distribute resources. In the context of public diplomacy, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) provides a means, albeit arguably cumbersome, to directly engage foreign audiences with journalistic content. The role of the BBG in public diplomacy like any organization tied to the government is less than optimal in many ways and short of the ideal, yet provides a mechanism which otherwise may not exist.

Assessing the impact that the broadcasters are having is an extremely difficult task to undertake and likely part of the reason that the BBG is seen as being organizationally challenged. Although there are metrics showing measures of performance, namely the numbers of people each of the broadcasters reach, measuring the effectiveness of any messaging is significantly more challenging.  To improve this, one potential solution is to develop more discrete objectives for each of the broadcasters. Vague high level objectives such as “promoting U.S. interests abroad” or “advancing vital U.S. interests” cannot be measured in a way that provides a strong argument in support of or against the performance of the BBG in public diplomacy.

One solution to the perceived weakness of the BBG is to have major broadcast companies (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox News and CNN) appoint members to a newly designed board of governors. This though implicitly assumes that those organizations are inherently better at promoting U.S. interests abroad than the broadcasting organizations that have been doing it for decades. Furthermore, in this suggestion, there is no empirical evidence that these organizations can do anything other than attract U.S. viewers/listeners and also limited evidence that this new governing model would enhance the journalistic integrity of the existing broadcasters. 

Week 2: What we can learn from PD Case Studies

Related to the point about “listening” that I discussed in my blog entry last week, I found that one of the central lessons that PD practitioners discovered was that their efforts were most successful when actually thinking about what the local population wants, or how they think about and interpret different ideas, instead of focusing only on what the U.S. policymakers are dictating.  Having a better understanding of the local culture and the local population is invaluable, as it gives these officers insight into better handling their work and what will be the most successful way to interact with the public.  Walter Douglas’ explained his experience in Pakistan, and he noted how many communications specialists’ lack of understanding or listening, and instead, their jump to engaging and informing, hoping that those steps will automatically lead to influence.  His discussion of the embassy realizing the need to delve into Urdu instead of relying on only English sources (to get a real sense of what was going on in Pakistan) was a perfect example of how a lack of understanding can lead to misguided policies.

Another lesson I discovered from reading the various studies involves that of using one’s resources wisely and to their utmost capabilities.  The lack of money or funding for PD efforts in certain countries is absolutely limiting, but I thought there were some very creative alternative projects undertaken that didn’t necessarily involve the more typical exchange programs to the U.S. 

One of my favorite case studies in Kiehl’s book was the chapter by Elizabeth McKay on her work in Turkey.  She gives very clear, specific and incredibly creative examples of actual public diplomacy projects that were started in-country and how their initiatives really tried to cater to what their audiences wanted from them.  She described the Youth Innovation and Entrepreneurship Program (YIEP), that involved working with local public schools and specifically communities “where students would otherwise have little to no opportunity to participate in a USG program or would have little direct exposure to Americans and not know America beyond conventional stereotypes.”  They trained teachers, organized hands-on experience for students, provided technological opportunities to learn, and held a regional business fair for the high school teams to compete in and share products and ideas.  Another project was the Youth Filmmakers, that gave young people an opportunity to convey their views on an international stage on issues they cared about, a program incredibly well-organized and with a widespread and continued impact post film screenings.

In terms of making public diplomacy efforts more successful, I think the new law requiring information released by embassies to be closely monitored by Washington is somewhat dangerous to the goals.  As the U.S. Embassy in Iraq experienced, the ability to speak freely and have conversations through immediate forums like social media sites is important, and although there should certainly be a balance to ensure security, rigid monitors can provide a particular handicap to PD effectiveness.  I also felt that working “across lines” was necessary to make PD more successful.  It is okay to have different “lanes” for the various roles performed by information officers, cultural officers, political officers, etc., but working cohesively as a unit to promote public diplomacy (which touches all of those fields) is also incredibly important.  This cohesive attitude, however, goes beyond the inner dynamics of the embassies and the government agencies involved in that country, and should reach beyond, partnering with non-profits, academia, foundations, the private sector, etc.  The Brazil case study explained this well.  This can also address my earlier point about financial restrictions, because partnering with other organization can present new funding opportunities, but also support in other resources that could allow more creative ideas for PD outreach.

The Importance of Public Diplomacy
The term public diplomacy (PD) has evolved in both definition and application since its conception. While current understanding of PD is more nuanced than the early Cold War PD, which established the field’s foundation, it is important to understand the back ground and mission of PD from 1953 – 1999. Following World War II, and with numerous recommendations to President Eisenhower, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was first charged with “executing U.S public diplomacy efforts to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. interests, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and foreign publics (Nakamura, 10).” Essentially, this era of PD was intended to provide shaping information to foreign countries about the U.S., while providing the U.S. government information about foreign attitudes that assist with foreign policies and decision. This period of PD particularly struck me as it was indicative of the Cold War, early PD to be essentially trying to win hearts and minds through information sharing.

            Although USIA’s functions were officially transferred to the US State’s Department (DoS) in 1999, the overall intent of PD is still vital. Leading the efforts for the DoS is the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. While this position has been vacant 30% of the time since its conception, the role and mission of PD has shifted, perhaps decreasing the need for a PD. I think Gregory may have said it best “public diplomacy is now so central to diplomacy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as a sub-set to diplomatic practice (Gregory, 353).”

            So what is PD today, and how does it affect foreign policy? While it appears there is some debate over the specific terms used to appropriately describe today’s PD (Gregory), there are common themes that prove the relevance of PD in today’s context. The definition that best embodies today’s PD is provided by Gregory – PD has come to mean an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-states and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values (Gregory, 353). However to ensure PD is relevant within greater foreign policy today, and reaching beyond USIA’s mandate, the elements of engagement, listening/understanding and establishing a communications goal are critical differentiators.

            The authors we read provided numerous best practices and key attributes of modern PD, however engagement, listening/understanding and establishing a communications goal, really solidify PD in the current administration and global context. As pointed out by Wallin, the Military has been communicating the majority of the American policies overseas the last decade. Neither bad nor good, this is this a perfect example that PD is truly a daily engagement. Although more effective when the engagement is strategic and targeted, PD can come in any shape and size. If engagement such as our military can serve as PD, then it is critical that messages are crafted with care and precision to ensure that wide dissemination is available. Additionally, understanding a target audience and listening to that target audience. Wallin’s point that listening is active and proves two way information is critical. Looking again at the military example, specifically the two wars over the last decade, we should consider the impact PD could have played with successful understanding and listening (real listening). Finally, by establishing a communications goal, practitioners within the field of PD can establish tangible goals and measure against these goals. Where PD has been weak to link their successes to foreign policy achievements, metrics may further emphasize the importance of this field within today’s context.

            Under the Obama Administration, and shown through Gregory’s article, PD is seen as a responsibility of every citizen and diplomat. That being said, it is still a critical field that needs to be measured and understood. It needs careful messaging developed for in order to maintain relationship, build new ones, and understand perceptions worldwide. 

Public Diplomacy: Its Importance and Challenges

The term and concept of public diplomacy has varied a bit throughout the years, especially in the United States, and can be defined slightly differently depending on the era, according to James Pamment.  However, Pamment even agrees with the other authors in its core components: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting.  Matthew Wallin uses the definition: “communication with foreign publics for the purpose of achieving a foreign policy objective.”  He also adds “psychological warfare” to the list of core components that Pamment recognized.  Nakamura and Weed note, in other words, that public diplomacy can be used by governments to “interact directly with foreign citizens, community and civic leaders, journalists and other opinion leaders,” and convince those individuals through lasting relationships and better understanding that its policies are justified and should be locally supported.

The problem with this tool, however, is that it can often be criticized as a form of propaganda, and without the proper credibility behind or follow-up to the government’s proposed actions, public diplomacy can create a bad reputation for the United States and limit its policy options.  Public diplomacy in practice is therefore incredibly important, and should be used simultaneously with all policy decisions affecting a particular foreign country.  Without it, U.S. national security (or other international) efforts can absolutely be undermined, as we’re seeing throughout the Middle East, with the U.S. image largely unchanged and counter to its development and conflict resolution efforts.  Yet, not everyone agrees with PD’s importance.  Wallin effectively depicts its main challenges as: “under-financed, under-resourced, under-led, and under the radar.”

One core principle that I personally felt was slipping through the cracks (in terms of achieving effective public diplomacy) is the “listening” component.  Having recently taken a course on culture and conflict resolution, I was immediately reminded when reading these articles about the need to go into other countries open-minded and willing to try and understand the way their public sees the world.  Although the U.S. recognizes that “resentments prevent collaboration” and that it should therefore constantly work at maintaining a good reputation and image among the people and leaders of other nations in order to achieve its goals, the U.S. doesn’t seem to be practicing this notion at all.  Reading through several case studies pointed out that the U.S. is not doing nearly enough listening, but is rather largely preaching what it sees as right for the other country.  These situations only foster resentment and frustration with the United States, and make foreign publics (and their leaders) hesitant about working with us or supporting our policies, and even skeptical about our real motives whenever a policy seems to be good.

Public diplomacy can be a great tool to accomplish our goals abroad, but the U.S. must stop acting primarily for its own interests without regard to another country’s, or especially choosing a U.S.-centric style of addressing issues that is not in balance with the customs of the foreign country.  For example, many approaches to problems in the Middle East have been seen and acted upon through a predominantly U.S. lens, and our continued negative perception despite all our efforts throughout the years highlights this lack of understanding.